Independent Application of State Constitutional Provisions to Questions of Criminal Procedure by Klumb, Eric
Marquette Law Review
Volume 62
Issue 4 Summer 1979 Article 5
Independent Application of State Constitutional
Provisions to Questions of Criminal Procedure
Eric Klumb
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Eric Klumb, Independent Application of State Constitutional Provisions to Questions of Criminal Procedure, 62 Marq. L. Rev. 596 (1979).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol62/iss4/5
THE INDEPENDENT APPLICATION OF STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS TO
QUESTIONS OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Since constitutional questions arise frequently in criminal
practice,' defense attorneys may find this area particularly well
suited to the independent application of state constitutional
law. In matters of criminal procedure, as in other constitutional
areas examined in this issue, the successful enlargement of
federal constitutional rights depends upon the utilization of
state constitutional provisions in combination with the ade-
quate state ground doctrine. 2 Frequent application of state law
to questions of criminal procedure may be particularly appro-
priate since the state court has the opportunity to observe first-
hand the problems of local criminal law enforcement. Such
familiarity gives rise to a degree of expertise not shared by the
Supreme Court of the United States. It therefore is not surpris-
ing that the Supreme Court views independent state constitu-
tional rulemaking as a proper experimental means of accom-
modating unique local criminal investigative and law enforce-
ment demands. 3 Ironically, some state courts have chosen not
to unilaterally expand on federally established minimums due
to a concern for uniform and consistent nationwide law enforce-
ment.' It seems clear, however, by virtue of their diverse situa-
tions, that courts in New York and Alaska will see recurring
criminal procedure problems of an altogether different nature.
For this reason, these states should probably view even identi-
cal state constitutional provisions in a different light, based on
their differing circumstances.
1. Constitutions are, of course, limitations on a government's power in dealing with
its citizens, a relationship which explains the frequency of constitutional questions in
criminal cases. "It [is] in criminal prosecutions that the power of the state [is]
arrayed most clearly against the individual." Yackle, The Burger Court and the Fourth
Amendment, 26 KAN. L. REv. 335, 428 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Yackle]. Mr.
Yackle provides valuable insight into problems of fourth amendment analysis.
2. See Introduction: An Examination of the Wisconsin Constitution, 62 MARQ. L.
REv. 483 (1979).
3. See, e.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 728 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See also Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 376 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring); Sibron
v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 60-61 (1968); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34 (1963).
4. See Note, Stepping Into the Breach: Basing Defendants' Rights on State Rather
Than Federal Law, 15 Am. CIM. L. REV. 339, 340 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Stepping
Into the Breach].
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
I. PRAcricAL PROBLEMS AT THE INTERFACE BETWEEN
FEDERAL AND STATE SUPREME COURTS
The application of state constitutional provisions is not
without pitfalls, however. To understand the practical prob-
lems inherent in the utilization of nonfederal grounds to en-
large the rights of the criminal defendant, one need only con-
sider the following example. Assuming that the majority of a
state supreme court feels strongly about the application of con-
stitutional principles, both state and federal, to a particular set
of facts, the state court will, at the very least, desire to make
its ruling the law of the state. At best, the court would like to
see its ruling applied nationally. If the United States Supreme
Court has previously held contrary to the position of the state
court, there is but one path to walk. The state court must
simply set forth its ruling specifically articulating the non-
federal basis of the decision; it is then insulated from Supreme
Court review5 and assured of continued vitality on the state
level. Problems arise, however, when the Supreme Court has
not yet addressed the constitutional question before the state
court. In this situation, the state supreme court faces a knotty
technical problem. If it bases its decision either solely on state
grounds or on both state and federal grounds, the United States
Supreme Court is precluded from agreeing with the state court
on the issue,6 preventing, or at least postponing, a nationwide
application of the rule. In such a case, the utilization of inde-
pendent state grounds, motivated primarily out of fear of rever-
sal, may prevent the Supreme Court from passing upon worthy
issues of national importance.
On the other hand, if only a federal ground is used, the
Supreme Court may reverse without remanding. To the major-
ity of the state court, such a turn of events has three negative
results. First, the defendant in the case in question is deprived
of the beneficial state court ruling, and this is so merely be-
cause the state court desired to give the Supreme Court a
chance to agree. Second, the state court must await a similar
case before it can again rule as it originally desired. In the
meantime, the trial courts of the state will apply the federal
5. Failk, Foreword: The State Constitution: A More than "Adequate" Nonfederal
Ground, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 273, 275 (1973).
6. Id. at n.12.
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rule, and the defense bar will very likely neglect to appeal the
issue. Finally, the Supreme Court will have established per-
suasive authority on the issue, thereby providing impetus to
other state courts to hoid in conformity with the federal rule.7
Of course, if the Supreme Court reverses and remands, the
state court may invoke an adequate and independent state
ground, curing the first two undesirable effects: the defendant
will gain the desired relief, and a local rule of state constitu-
tional dimension will be established. However, there is no guar-
antee that such cases will be remanded to state courts for con-
sideration in light of state constitutional standards. This fur-
ther complicates a state court's selection of a constitutional
basis, state or federal, for its ruling.
Two recent United States Supreme Court decisions illus-
trate this problem. In Oregon v. Hass,8 the defendant had been
given his Miranda warnings9 and had requested counsel.'0 Upon
being questioned, however, the defendant made statements to
the police. The Oregon Supreme Court held that these state-
ments were inadmissible for any purpose," distinguishing
Harris v. New York,' 2 which held that statements made by a
defendant who had not received Miranda warnings were admis-
sible for impeachment purposes.'3 The United States Supreme
7. Id. at 280.
8. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
9. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), requires that the following procedures
must be observed in order to properly safeguard a suspect's fifth amendment rights
against self-incrimination: the individual in custody must, prior to interrogation, be
told that he has the right to remain silent; that anything he says can and will be used
against him in a court of law; that he has the right to consult with an attorney and to
have the attorney present at the interrogation; and that if he is indigent, an attorney
will be appointed as his counsel. Id. at 444-45, 467-73. If the above procedures are not
followed, any statements which are made by the defendant are not admissible in the
prosecution's case in chief. Id. at 479.
10. 420 U.S. at 715-16. Once a suspect requests an attorney, the interrogation must
cease until one is present. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 474.
11. State v. Hass, 267 Ore. 489, 517 P.2d 671 (1973).
12. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
13. Id. at 226. The Oregon court recognized the validity of the Harris rationale
which was premised on the theory that, insofar as the prospect of exclusion of the
statements from the state's case in chief will sufficiently deter the police from failing
to give adequate Miranda warnings, it is not necessary to hold the statements inadmis-
sible for impeachment purposes. The Oregon court further reasoned that a police
officer will ordinarily give adequate warnings, since "[elxperience has taught" that
there is a good possibility that the suspect will talk during questioning. State v. Hass,
267 Ore. at _ 517 P.2d at 673. However, the court reasoned that when an officer
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Court reversed the Oregon court, finding that the statements,
though inadmissible in the State's case in chief, could be intro-
duced to impeach the defendant should he testify to the con-
trary. 14
Significantly, the Supreme Court did not remand the case,"
and to date, the Supreme Court of Oregon has had no oppor-
tunity to pass again on the question. We are left without a clue
as to whether the Oregon court's inclination on the merits will
surface again as a creature of its state constitution.
Mr. Justice Marshall, dissenting in Hass, 6 was troubled by
the majority's failure to remand the case to the Oregon court
for clarification as to the basis, state or federal, of the decision.
The majority flatly states that the case was decided below
solely on federal constitutional grounds, but I am not so cer-
tain. Although the state court did not expressly cite state law
in support of its judgment, its opinion suggests that it may
well have considered the matter one of state as well as federal
law ... [and] it seems quite possible that the state court
intended its decision to rest at least in part on independent
state grounds. In any event, I agree with Mr. Justice Jackson
that state courts should be "asked rather than told what they
have intended.' 7
However, Justice Marshall's well-founded concern was proba-
bly misplaced in Hass. The Oregon court had specifically based
its ruling on one prior Oregon and two prior federal decisions.18
The state case upon which the Oregon court relied quite clearly
had its basis solely in federal constitutional law; in fact, the
has given the warnings and the defendant asks for an attorney, the exclusion of any
subsequent statements from the state's case in chief does not deter further improper
questioning at all. The officer, realizing that the defendant will probably make no
statements once he talks to his attorney, may attempt to obtain admissions from the
defendant before the attorney arrives in order to give the prosecution valuable im-
peachment evidence. From the officer's standpoint nothing has been lost by continuing
the interrogation after the suspect asks for an attorney. Id.
14. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. at 722-24.
15. Id. at 724.
16. 420 U.S. 726 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 728.
18. The Oregon decision stated: "In such a situation, there is no pressure what-
soever to obtain compliance and the prophylactic exclusion of the evidence as dictated
by Miranda, Escobedo, and Neely [239 Ore. 487, 395 P.2d 557 (1964), modified and
rev'd on rehearing, 398 P.2d 482 (1965)] is still required." State v. Hass, 267 Ore. 489,
-, 517 P.2d 671, 673 (1973) (footnotes omitted).
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court in that decision specifically declined to determine the
applicability of the state constituion.'" Consequently, there was
no state constitutional foundation for the Oregon court's hold-
ing in Hass.
The question remains, however, whether sound principles of
federalism would favor remanding a case such as Hass to the
state court to consider application of its own law even though
the original decision was based on federal law.2 u Albeit inad-
vertently, that is precisely what occurred in South Dakota v.
Opperman.2,
In Opperman, the Supreme Court held that a custodial or
inventory search of a lawfully seized automobile pursuant to
standard police procedures was reasonable and not prohibited
by the fourth amendment.2 2 The setting in Opperman was
nearly identical to that in Hass. In each case, the trial court
had denied the defendant's suppression motion, the defendant
was convicted, the state supreme court reversed solely on the
basis of defendant's constitutional objection2 3 and the United
States Supreme Court reversed the state decision.24 For some
unspoken reason, however, the court in Hass merely reversed
while in Opperman it reversed and remanded. The Oregon
Supreme Court was thus deprived of the second chance af-
forded the South Dakota court. That court, following the
suggestion of Justice Marshall in dissent, 5 found on remand
19. We have never held that the Oregon constitutional prohibition against self-
incrimination . . . was the basis of this exclusionary rule and we need not
determine that issue . . . . [T]he right to remain silent during a police interro-
gation [is] a Fourteenth Amendment right derived from the Fifth Amendment
of the Federal Constitution.
State v. Neely, 239 Ore. 487, -, 395 P.2d 557, 560-61 (1964), modified and rev'd on
rehearing, 398 P.2d 482 (1965) (citations omitted).
20. For a scathing criticism of such federalism in constitutional law, see Yackle,
supra note 1, at 432.
21. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
22. Id.
23. State v. Opperman, 228 N.W.2d 152 (S.D. 1975); State v. Hass, 267 Ore. 489,
517 P.2d 671 (1973).
24. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714
(1975).
25. "On the remand it should be clear in any event that this Court's holding does
not preclude a contrary resolution of this case or others involving the same issues under
any applicable state law. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 726 (1975) (MARSHALL, J.,
dissenting)." South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 396 (1976) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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that its own state constitutional prohibition against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures, almost identical to the fourth
amendment, required that its original ruling be reinstated as
a matter of state law.26
It is unfortunate that issues involving implementation of
basic state policies may rise and fall depending on whether the
United States Supreme Court adds a few extra words at the
end of its opinion. As a practical matter, however, the problem
is of little concern to the appellate advocate, whose immediate
concern is instead to persuade the court that the defendant has
a valid constitutional grievance. After arguing the merits of the
constitutional question, however, there would seem to be value
in asking a state supreme court to rule on the basis of the state
constitution. Furthermore, it would be consistent with basic
principles of federalism to request that the United States Su-
preme Court, should it disagree with the position of the defen-
dant, remand the case to the state court to afford it the oppor-
tunity to utilize a variant state constitutional interpretation.
IX. SUPERVISORY POWERS
The theory that local problems require local rulemaking
supports the independent use of state constitutional provisions
in expanding the rights of criminal defendants. However, in
order to avail itself of the adequate state ground doctrine, a
state court need only base its holding on any nonfederal
ground. Such grounds may be statutory,27 constitutional or
may arise out of the common law. 2 Being mindful of local
problems in criminal procedure, yet hesitant to interpret its
state charter to be at odds with the Federal Constitution, a
state court might instead avail itself of its supervisory powers.29
In McNabb v. United States," the United States Supreme
Court commented on its supervisory power:
26. State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D. 1976).
27. State ex rel. Arnold v. County Court of Rock County, 51 Wis. 2d 434, 187
N.W.2d 354 (1971).
28. See Introduction: An Examination of the Wisconsin Constitution, 62 MARQ. L.
Rv. 483 (1979).
29. See generally Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69 COLUM.
L. REV. 181 (1969); Note, The Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 76 HARv. L.
Rav. 1656 (1963).
30. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
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[T]he scope of our reviewing power over convictions brought
here from the federal courts is not confined to ascertainment
of constitutional validity. Judicial supervision of the admin-
istration of criminal justice in the federal courts implies the
duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of
procedure and evidence. . . .Moreover, review by this Court
of state action expressing its notion of what will best further
its own security in the administration of criminal justice
demands appropriate respect for the deliberative judgment of
a state in so basic an exercise of its jurisdiction.31
A state court, like a federal court, may exercise its supervi-
sory power, thereby providing an adequate state ground to in-
sulate its decision from further review. For example, in
Commonwealth v. Campana,32 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that "all charges resulting from [a] criminal epi-
sode of each appellant should have been consolidated at one
trial, and consequently the second prosecutions [involving the
same episode] violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. ' 3 3 The United States Supreme Court re-
manded "to consider whether [the] judgments are based on
federal or state constitutional grounds, or both."34 On remand,
the Pennsylvania court noted that "our supervisory power over
state criminal proceedings is broad, and this Court need not
• . .limit its decision to the minimum requirements of federal
constitutional law."3 The Pennsylvania Constitution, as relied
upon by the Campana court,3" vests the court with supervisory
powers.3 7 The Supreme Court of the United States subse-
quently declined to review the merits of the case, presumably
because the state court had relied on its supervisory powers3
In several post-Campana decisions, the Pennsylvania court has
specifically relied upon these powers to expand minimum fed-
eral constitutional guarantees.3 9
31. Id. at 340.
32. 452 Pa. 233, 304 A.2d 432 (1974).
33. Id. at 240, 304 A.2d at 434 (footnotes omitted).
34. Pennsylvania v. Campana, 414 U.S. 808 (1973).
35. Commonwealth v. Campana, 455 Pa. 622, 624, 314 A.2d 854, 855 (1974).
36. Id., at 624, 314 A.2d at 855.
37. PA. CONST. art. V, § 10.
38. Pennsylvania v. Campana, 417 U.S. 969 (1974) (summary denial of certiorari).
39. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Richman, 458 Pa. 167, 320 A.2d 351, 357, 361
(1974) (Pomeroy, J., concurring) (right to counsel extended to pre-indictment line-
ups). Contra, Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court, like its counterpart in
Pennsylvania, is vested with "superintending and administra-
tive authority over all the courts."4 This broad and undefined
power has in the past been exercised only in extraordinary
circumstances, either when an adequate remedy was unavaila-
ble on appeal or when appellate relief might cause a party
irreparable hardship.41 That power is apparently jurisdiction-
ally based and limited to matters of judicial procedure.2 It is
therefore unclear whether this constitutional authority would
encompass the full range of criminal procedural law which, of
course, entails both substantive and procedural considerations
of both the courts and law enforcement agencies. The Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court, however, has demonstrated its willingness
to exercise such authority in new and unusual situations. For
example, in Scarbrough v. State,43 the court made specific use
of its constitutional superintending authority to take notice of
inadequate judicial resources in Milwaukee County as a partial
justification for an eight month pretrial delay.44
However, the use of this constitutionally based superin-
tending authority as a means of implementing independent
state constitutional expansion is untested in the State of Wis-
consin, and analytically, it is probably the better practice for
40. WIs. CONST. art. VII, § 3(1). See Mosing v. Hagen, 33 Wis. 2d 636, 148 N.W.2d
93 (1967). There may also exist a common-law foundation for the court's supervisory
power over criminal procedures. In civil cases, the court has held that when the state
constitution was adopted, the authority to regulate procedure was considered an inher-
ent judicial power. In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 240 N.W. 441 (1932). However, the
court was referring to judicial procedure, and therefore presumably not procedures
employed by law enforcement authorities. Certainly the law of criminal procedure
involves both judicial and law enforcement procedures and thus it is unclear whether
such inherent power encompasses the regulation of police procedures. But there may
be little difference between the regulation of police as opposed to judicial procedure.
For example, although the question of the propriety of a given search ostensibly deals
only with investigative practice, the exclusion from evidence of the fruits of such a
search is solely a matter of trial procedure.
41. State ex rel. LaFollette v. Circuit Court, 37 Wis. 2d 329, 155 N.W.2d 141 (1967).
42. The superintending power "is a high power, which enables this court, by the
use of all necessary and proper writs . . . to control the course of litigation in inferior
courts when such a court either refuses to act within its jurisdiction, or acts beyond
its jurisdiction, to the serious prejudice of the citizen." State ex rel. Reynolds v. County
Court, 11 Wis. 2d 560, 565, 105 N.W.2d 876, 879 (1960) (quoting State ex rel. Tewalt
v. Polland, 112 Wis. 232, 234, 87 N.W. 1107, 1108-09 (1901))(emphasis added).
43. 76 Wis. 2d 87, 250 N.W.2d 354 (1977).
44. Id. at 103 n.28, 250 N.W.2d at 362 n.28. Of course, this use of the power may
not be exactly the sort desired by the defense bar.
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the court to base independent constitutional rulings on a sub-
stantive constitutional provision rather than to engage in
quasi-legislative rulemaking under the guise of its supervisory
powers.
Ill. THE VIEW OF THE WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT:
WAVERING ON INDEPENDENT EXPANSION
Several state courts, most notably in California, 5 Alaska "
and Hawaii,47 have charted the revitalization of their constitu-
tions with amazing vigor. 8 Wisconsin has not. The decisions
examined below indicate that while traditionally the Wiscon-
sin court has exhibited progressive tendencies in the area of
constitutional criminal procedure, it has yet to fully implement
the state expansionist model in its modern context. Such ex-
pansion occurs when a state court specifically recognizes that
it is affording greater constitutional protections under the state
charter than those which are mandated by fourteenth amend-
ment principles. It will be seen, however, that at least two
members of the court49 have given solid recognition to the ex-
45. Allen v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 520, 557 P.2d 65, 134 Cal. Rptr. 774 (1976)
(defendant's privilege against self-incrimination limits scope of prosecutorial discov-
ery); People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975)
(rejecting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), which held permissible a
full search incident to any custodial arrest based on probable cause); People v. Moore,
69 Cal. 2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1968) (exclusionary rule applied to
commitment proceedings for adults). For an exhaustive listing of cases illustrating the
California court's willingness to rely on its own constitution, see Falk, Foreword: The
State Constitution: A More than "Adequate" Nonfederal Ground, 61 CALIF. L. REV.
273, 277 nn.16 & 17, 278 n.18 (1973).
46. See, e.g., Blue v. State, 558 P.2d 636 (Alaska 1977) (extending right to counsel
to line-ups held prior to charging or arguably even before arrest). Contra, Kirby v.
Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972). Cf. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975) (Alaska's
constitutional privacy clause protects private use of marijuana in one's home); Roberts
v. State, 458 P.2d 340 (Alaska 1969) (right to counsel at taking of handwriting exem-
plars).
47. See, e.g., State v. Kaluna, 55 Hawaii 361, 520 P.2d 51 (1974) (rejecting United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)); State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d
657 (1971); text accompanying notes 133-35 infra.
48. For an amendment-by-amendment breakdown of examples of different states'
reliance on state constitutions, see Stepping Into the Breach, supra note 4; Project
Report: Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
271 (1973).
49. See note 76 infra. The most vociferous advocate of the new federalism on the
Wisconsin court is Justice Abrahamson. In the most recent term of the court, Justice
Abrahamson has twice written concurring opinions in which she suggests that the
Wisconsin constitutional provision against unreasonable searches and seizures should
[Vol. 62:596
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pansionist model in the face of the court's general refusal to
apply it.
The State of Wisconsin was barely ten years old when the
supreme court decided Carpenter v. Dane County,0 in which
the court found that an accused felon had a constitutional right
to have counsel appointed at the expense of the state. This
decision predated the identical federal ruling by over 100
years5' and was in that sense highly progressive. Carpenter,
however, does not stand for the proposition that Wisconsin has
historically expanded federal constitutional rights. That deci-
sion preceded the adoption of the fourteenth amendment by
nine years,5 2 coming at a time when federal intervention in
state criminal procedure was unforeseen. Therefore, while
Carpenter does demonstrate the willingness of the Wisconsin
court to independently construe and apply state constitutional
provisions, it is not a bona fide example of state expansion on
federal constitutional minimums in its modern context.
In 1923, the Wisconsin court decided Hoyer v. State,5 3
thereby adopting the exclusionary rule some 40 years before the
rule was imposed upon the states by the United States Su-
preme Court." Like Carpenter, the Hoyer decision was not at
odds with federal constitutional law; the United States Su-
preme Court had already applied the exclusionary rule to fed-
eral criminal cases 5 and Wisconsin was merely aligning itself
with the prevailing federal rule.
State v. Kroenig" is another case often cited as an example
of the Wisconsin court's expansionist tendencies. 5 Kroenig
serve as the basis for determining the validity of warrantless searches. Thompson v.
State, 83 Wis. 2d 134, 265 N.W.2d 467 (1978) (Abrahamson, J., concurring); State v.
Starke, 81 Wis. 2d 399, 260 N.W.2d 739 (1978) (Abrahamson, J., concurring, joined
by Heffernan, J.). In the most recent case, the state ground had not even been briefed
by the parties. Thompson v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 134, 149, 265 N.W.2d 467, 474 (1978).
The practice of espousing disposition of a case on grounds not briefed may be poor
jurisprudence, but it is at least arguably more appropriate in a concurring or dissenting
opinion.
50. 9 Wis. 249 (1859).
51. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
52. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution was ratified on
July 9, 1868.
53. 180 Wis. 407, 193 N.W. 89 (1923).
54. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
55. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
56. 274 Wis. 266, 79 N.W.2d 810 (1956).
57. See, e.g., Browne v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 491, 503 n.5, 129 N.W.2d 175, 180 n.5
(1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1004 (1965); see also Project Report: Toward an Activist
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held that evidence of a blood test taken at the request of police
officers prior to an arrest and without a warrant must be ex-
cluded under the Wisconsin constitutional provision pertaining
to searches and seizures. Approximately three months later,
the United States Supreme Court, faced with similar facts,
managed to avoid the merits of the constitutional issue by
declaring once again that fourth amendment proscriptions
against unreasonable searches and seizures did not apply to the
states.1 Kroenig did not depart in any way from federal prece-
dent. Rather, it merely stated a rule of law for Wisconsin in the
absence of federal authority.
In the 1964 decision of State ex rel. Barth v. Burke," the
court extended the right to counsel to misdemeanor defendants
facing any substantial prison sentence. While the Barth ruling
preceded the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Argersinger v. Hamlin,0 which extended this right to state
criminal defendants, it was, like the foregoing cases, not at
variance with contemporaneous federal constitutional law as
applied to federal criminal prosecutions.61
Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 271, 349 (1973). Curiously
enough, the court in Browne held that search and seizure questions are matters of
"federal constitutional law" while in the same breath recognizing Kroenig as a case
where state constitutional standards were more demanding. 24 Wis. 2d at 502-03, 129
N.W.2d at 179-80. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has recently voiced approval of
Kroenig in dictum. State v. Jenkins, 80 Wis. 2d 426, 429, 259 N.W.2d 109, 111 (1977).
58. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957). The United States Supreme Court
has, of course, overruled Breithaupt in that respect. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
But see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), wherein the Court held that a
blood test taken incident to arrest was constitutionally permissible. The Court inti-
mated that, given the possibility that passage of time could result in the destruction
of evidence, a blood test taken prior to arrest might be permissible. Id. at 770-71. The
supreme courts of Texas and Michigan have rejected Schmerber on state constitutional
and statutory grounds, respectively. See, Stepping Into the Breach, supra note 4, at
347-48.
59. 24 Wis. 2d 82, 128 N.W.2d 422 (1964).
60. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). The Argersinger Court held that a defendant who faced
potential incarceration upon conviction was entitled to counsel under the sixth amend-
ment.
61. It must be noted that Barth came on the heels of Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963), and thus one might infer that the Wisconsin Supreme Court was not
engaged in any independent constitutional analysis, but was merely interpreting fed-
eral constitutional maxims. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court had pre-
viously invoked the right to counsel in "all" federal criminal prosecutions in Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). Finally, two factors downplay the Barth decision as
expansionist precedent: the court discussed no decision or constitutional provision,
federal or state, in making its "constitutional" holding, thus clouding the actual foun-
[Vol. 62:596
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The only pristine example of the court's application of the
modern expansionist model is found in State v. Wallace.6 2 In
Wallace, the court upheld the well-established Wisconsin rule
that, in a hearing to determine the admissibility of a defen-
dant's confession, the state must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the confession was voluntarily given and not the
result of coercion. 3 The decision was contrary to a then-recent
Supreme Court decision 4 which held that the federal constitu-
tion required proof by a mere preponderance of the evidence.
The Wisconsin court quoted the United States Supreme Court
as follows: "Of course, the states are free, pursuant to their own
law, to adopt a higher standard. They may indeed differ as to
the appropriate resolution of the values that they find at
stake."65 Since the Wisconsin court characterized the burden of
the prosecutor as being "constitutional"66 it may be assumed
that the Wisconsin Constitution served as the basis for the
decision. 7
As if in balance, the state court has, on at least one occa-
sion, also lowered its standards to meet federal minimums. At
one time, the prevailing Wisconsin rule recognized the right to
counsel at a precharge lineup. However, after the United
States Supreme Court denied the right to counsel in such a
situation" the Wisconsin court followed suit,70 confessing that
its prior ruling had not been based on its independent judg-
dation of the decision; further, the defendant faced a total of 19 years of possible
imprisonment. In view of these factors, even though the defendant was charged only
with several misdemeanors, it is not certain that the Wisconsin court would have
recognized the defendant's right to counsel had he been faced with, for example, only
a six-month term upon conviction. The decision did not read as if it was to be applied
to misdemeanor defendants in general.
62. 59 Wis. 2d 66, 207 N.W.2d 855 (1973).
63. Id. at 79-80, 207 N.W.2d at 862.
64. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
65. State v. Wallace, 59 Wis. 2d at 80, 207 N.W.2d at 862 (quoting Lego v. Twomey,
404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972)).
66. 59 Wis. 2d at 79, 207 N.W. 2d at 862.
67. The import of Wallace as an expansionist case may be lessened by the fact that
the state did not contest its constitutional burden. "The trial court specifically found
that the statements made in . . . [the prosecutor's] office was [sic] voluntary, be-
yond reasonable doubt, and on appeal the state has in no way intimated that this court
should now change its long established rule." Id. at 80, 207 N.W.2d at 862. Therefore,
the issue was not technically before the court.
68. Hayes v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 93, 175 N.W.2d 626 (1970).
69. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
70. State v. Taylor, 60 Wis. 2d 506, 520-24, 210 N.W.2d 873, 881-83 (1973).
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ment but on its mistaken interpretation of previous United
States Supreme Court decisions.7' And while the court recog-
nized its power to impose stricter state standards, it declined
to do so. 71
One would hesitate, then, to characterize the Wisconsin
Supreme Court as traditionally activist. Although the decisions
are in a sense progressive, only in Wallace did the court recog-
nize a divergence in the scope of the Wisconsin and United
States Constitutions and even this conclusion is based on infer-
ence. Those cases in which the Wisconsin Supreme Court held
in conformity with the prevailing, more protectionist federal
rule in advance of the Court's fourteenth amendment applica-
tion to the states are not examples of independent expansive
construction of state constitutional provisions. Nonetheless,
the importance of these decisions should not be overlooked.
One of the factors supporting independent expansionist activ-
ity is a court's view of traditions and values unique to the
people of its state. 73 Although the Wisconsin court has not yet
fully embraced the expansionist model, the presence of prior
progressive decisions does serve as a barometer of state tradi-
tions. An appellant would therefore be wise to bring these deci-
sions to the court's attention when requesting an independent
state constitutional analysis. 74
71. Id. at 523, 210 N.W.2d at 882.
72. State v. Taylor, 60 Wis. 2d 506, 210 N.W.2d 873 (1973). Ironically, the Wallace
case, decided the same year as Taylor, is susceptible to a similar argument. The
foundation case for the rule approved in Wallace was State ex rel. Goodchild v. Burke,
27 Wis. 2d 244, 133 N.W.2d 753 (1965). In Goodchild, the court's analysis was restricted
primarily to issues of federal constitutional law. Thus, had it chosen to do so, the
Wisconsin court could have held that the rule had no independent state basis, and then
lowered the prosecutor's burden in accordance with the federal rule. See notes 65-69
and accompanying text supra.
73. See Introduction: An Examination of the Wisconsin Constitution, 62 MARQ. L.
REv. 483 (1979).
74. In State v. Doe, 78 Wis. 2d 161, 171-72, 254 N.W.2d 210, 216 (1976), Justice
Heffernan, writing for the court, cited Carpenter v. Dane County, 9 Wis. 249 (1859),
and Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 193 N.W. 89 (1923), as examples of Wisconsin's
willingness to expand state constitutional protection beyond federal minimums. The
court, however, chose not to exercise its prerogative in Doe and found that, in this
instance, federal and state constitutional principles were consistent. 78 Wis. 2d at 172,
254 N.W.2d at 216. Thus, although the court has utilized the expansionist model
sparingly, it has certainly recognized its power to do so.
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IV. SAMPLE APPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY TO SPECIFIC
PROBLEMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Historical analysis of the more activist decisions of the Wis-
consin Supreme Court indicates that the court has exhibited
progressive tendencies in three constitutional areas: search and
seizure, 7- right to counsel,76 and the privilege against self-
incrimination. 77 Armed with such precedent, an appellant
would probably enjoy a better chance of success in these areas.
Consequently, two specific criminal procedure problems will
now be examined: the vicarious standing rule and the use of
otherwise inadmissible confessions for impeachment purposes.
These two topics have been chosen for different reasons. The
vicarious standing rule will be examined because the Wisconsin
court has exhibited a substantive inclination toward the merits
of the rule. The confession-impeachment problem will be dis-
cussed because the court's decision in State v. Wallace has
already given greater scope to the privilege against self-
incrimination than that afforded by the United States Consti-
tution.
A. The Vicarious Standing Rule
The Supreme Court of the United States has held "that
suppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation
can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were vio-
lated by the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved solely
by the introduction of evidence."78 In Brown v. United States,"
the Supreme Court established a federal rule of limited stand-
ing. A defendant has standing only if: (1) he is on the premises
at the time of the contested search and seizure; (2) he enjoys a
proprietary or possessory interest in the premises; or (3) he is
charged with an offense which includes as an essential element
75. See State v. Kroenig, 274 Wis. 266, 79 N.W.2d 810 (1956); Hoyer v. State, 180
Wis. 407, 193 N.W. 89 (1923). See also Thompson v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 134, 265 N.W.2d
467 (1978) (Abrahamson, J., concurring); State v. Starke, 81 Wis. 2d 399, 260 N.W.2d
739 (1978) (Abrahamson, J., concurring); State v. Doe, 78 Wis. 2d 161, 254 N.W.2d
210 (1976).
76. See State ex rel. Barth v. Burke, 24 Wis. 2d 82, 182 N.W.2d 422 (1964); Carpen-
ter v. Dane County, 9 Wis. 249 (1859). See also State v. Wallace, 59 Wis. 2d 66, 207
N.W.2d 855 (1973). But see State v. Taylor, 60 Wis. 2d 506, 210 N.W.2d 873 (1973).
77. See State v. Wallace, 59 Wis. 2d 66, 207 N.W.2d 855 (1973).
78. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1969).
79. 411 U.S. 223 (1973).
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possession of the seized evidence at the time of the alleged
search and seizure.80 As a matter of federal constitutional law,
fourth amendment rights are personal and cannot be vicari-
ously asserted.8'
Recently, in Rakas v. Illinois,8 2 the Supreme Court again
reviewed the law of fourth amendment standing. While ac-
knowledging the vitality of the principles underlying the stand-
ing rules, the Court attempted to do away with the inquiry into
standing altogether, reasoning that the standing issue should
be absorbed by substantive fourth amendment analysis. As the
Court saw it, the issue in such cases is whether the defendant's
"legitimate expectation of privacy ' 83 has been invaded. If so,
the evidence of the search should be excluded. If, on the other
hand, no privacy expectations have been infringed, no exclu-
sion will result and no standing inquiry is needed.8 1
The result, of course, would be identical. To a defendant,
it is of little moment whether he lacks standing to contest the
search because the constable violated the privacy rights of a
third party rather than his own or whether he loses on the
merits because he lacks a judicially recognized expectation of
privacy. Under either the former traditional standing analysis
or the latter "expectation" analysis approved in Rakas, the
evidence is admitted at trial.
Contrary to either analysis, the vicarious or derivative
standing rule provides that a defendant may contest the valid-
ity of a search even though such search violated not his rights
but those of a third person." The rule has been adopted by the
supreme courts of two states86 and has received considerable
80. Id. at 229. The latter of these three standing requirements is often called
"automatic" standing and should not be confused with vicarious standing. See Jones
v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
81. Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 230; Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S.
165, 171-72; Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
82. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
83. Id. at 143 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
84. Mr. Justice White, dissenting, did not take issue with either the majority's view
of standing or its new single-step substantive analysis. The dissent merely felt that the
defendant's personal legitimate expectation of privacy had been violated. Id. at 156.
85. Stepping Into the Breach, supra note 4, at 342-43.
86. See Kaplan v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 3d 150, 491 P.2d 1, 98 Cal. Rptr. 649
(1971); State v. Culotta, 343 So. 2d 977 (La. 1976). Other states have either codified
or considered codifying the rule, listed in State v. Mabra, 61 Wis. 2d 613, 621-22, 213
N.W.2d 545, 549 (1973).
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support from commentators 87 and the courts. 88
In disallowing the derivative or vicarious assertion of fourth
amendment rights, the Supreme Court relied on the following
premise: "Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which,
like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously
asserted."89 Yet this "personal rights" premise is contrary to
contemporaneous fourth amendment analysis. For example, in
United States v. Calandra,"0 the Supreme Court held that the
exclusionary rule would not apply to exclude evidence from
grand jury proceedings even if such evidence was seized in
violation of fourth amendment rights. In so limiting the scope
of the exclusionary rule, the court portrayed it merely as a
"judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth
Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect,
rather than a personal constitutional right of the party ag-
grieved."91
For purposes of determining the scope of application of the
exclusionary rule in Calandra, the Court found the rule to be a
judicial device. For purposes of standing, however, the Court
has declared the rule to be a personal constitutional right.12 But
surely a proper analysis of the vicarious standing rule vis-a-vis
the exclusionary rule should not rely on mutually exclusive
major premises. Instead, given the currently recognized judi-
cial source of the exclusionary rule, a court should limit its
inquiry to whether the vicarious assertion of exclusionary rights
is consistent with, or in furtherance of, the underlying objec-
tives of the exclusionary rule as articulated by its judicial crea-
tors. Thus, the court must identify the purposes of the exclu-
sionary rule, without regard to its source, and then determine
87. See, e.g., State v. Mabra, 61 Wis. 2d 613, 622 n.3, 213 N.W.2d 545, 549 n.3
(1973); Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349,
367 (1967); Yackle, supra note 1, at 384; Note, Standing and the Fourth Amendment,
38 U. CiN. L. REv. 691 (1969); Comment, Standing to Object to Unreasonable Searches
and Seizures, 34 Mo. L. REv. 575 (1969).
88. See, e.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 200 (1969) (Fortas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
89. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978), (quoting Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969) and citing Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223
(1973)); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968)).
90. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).




the compatibility of those objectives with the application of the
vicarious standing rule.13
This is precisely the analysis undertaken by the California
Supreme Court in Kaplan v. Superior Court of Orange
County,4 in which the court reaffirmed a prior application of
the vicarious standing rule. 5 The California court explained
that the two-fold purpose of the exclusionary rule "was to deter
law enforcement officers from engaging in unconstitutional
searches and seizures by removing their incentive to do so, and
to relieve the courts from being compelled to participate in
such illegal conduct." 9 The court noted further that the dual
policies of the exclusionary rule are applicable whenever evi-
dence is obtained contrary to constitutional search and seizure
provisions, even if the defendant's personal constitutional
rights remained inviolate. 7 The court, however, declined to
determine whether the vicarious standing rule is required by
the California search and seizure clause,9" noting only that the
rule is "based on [the] constitutionally compelled" 9 exclu-
93. Although the "personal rights" premise seems to supply the major foundation
for the rejection of the vicarious standing rule, it is possible that the premise has
become merely a catch phrase restatement of the rule of limited standing. In Alderman
v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), the Supreme Court did examine the vicarious
standing rule in terms of its effect on the deterrent objectives of the exclusionary rule,
and held that sufficient deterrence would be achieved even if standing were granted
to only those persons whose individual fourth amendment rights were violated. There-
fore, it is possible that the foundation for the federal rule of limited standing is not
the "personal rights" premise, but rather the premise that the derivative assertion of
exclusionary rights would have a minimal effect on the deterrence of police miscon-
duct. Since this is precisely the analysis undertaken in United States v. Calandra, it
is arguable that Calandra and those cases which limit standing are not at all inconsist-
ent.
94. 6 Cal. 3d 150, 491 P.2d 1, 98 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1971).
95. The Supreme Court of California had originally adopted the vicarious standing
rule in People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955).
96. 6 Cal. 3d at 155-57, 491 P.2d at 4, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 651-52.
97. Id. at 156-58, 491 P.2d at 4-5, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 652-53. The logical inference is
that the California court does not view the exclusionary rule as an extension of an
individual's constitutional right.
98. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19.
99. 6 Cal. 3d at 161, 491 P.2d at 8, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 656. This nonconstitutional
ruling was all that was required for the disposition of the case. The prosecutor argued
that § 351 of the California Evidence Code, which stated that "(e)xcept as otherwise
provided by statute, all relevant evidence is admissible," constituted a legislative
preemption of the judicially created vicarious standing rule. This, of course, has the
ultimate effect of excluding relevant evidence even though such exclusion was not
provided by statute or, as argued the prosecution, by the California or federal constitu-
tions. The court responded with some history of legislative intent which indicated that
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sionary rule. While it is clear that the California court seized
the exclusionary rule itself as a constitutional mandate, it is
unclear whether the derivative standing rule is a constitu-
tional, as opposed to judicial, rule of law. In any event, the
ruling in Kaplan was founded exclusively on California law.
In Louisiana, the rule is clearly a creature of the state con-
stitution. In State v. Cullotta, '0 the Supreme Court of Louis-
iana held that a 1974 amendment to the Louisiana Constitu-
tion'01 granted standing to anyone adversely affected by a
search. Since a defendant against whom the fruits of a search
are offered as evidence is necessarily adversely affected by the
search, the court held that she had standing to contest it, not-
ing that the broadened application of the exlusionary rule was
founded in the "expectation that its deterrent effect will be
increased."10 2
Before discussing the Wisconsin Supreme Court's treat-
ment of vicarious standing, a brief history of the exclusionary
rule in Wisconsin seems in order. The rule, adopted in 1923 in
Hoyer v. State,' 3 was based on article I, sections 8 and 111"1 of
the Wisconsin Constitution, the state counterparts of the fifth
and fourth amendments, respectively. Justice Eschweiler, writ-
§ 351 was meant to preempt all limitations on the admissibility of relevant evidence
except those limitations "based on" a constitutional provision. Id. at 160, 491 P.2d at
7, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 655. Thus, the court had only to decide whether the vicarious
standing rule was constitutionally based and not whether it was constitutionally
compelled. Finding such basis, the rule fell within the exception to § 351.
100. 343 So. 2d 977 (La. 1977).
101. LA. CONST. art. I, § 5, as amended (1974) states:
Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of pri-
vacy. No warrant shall issue without probable cause supported by oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, the persons or
things to be seized, and the lawful purpose or reason for the search. Any person
adversely affected by a search or seizure conducted in violation of this Section
shall have standing to raise its illegality in the appropriate court.
102. 343 So. 2d at 982 (quoting Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louis-
iana Constitution of 1974, 35 LA. L. REV. 1, 23-24 (1974)).
103. 180 Wis. 407, 193 N.W. 89 (1923).
104. WIs. CONST. art. I, § 8 reads in relevant part: "No person. . . shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Wis. CONsT. art. I, §
11, reads as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and




ing for the Hoyer majority, held that an illegal search or seizure
violated the prohibition against unreasonable warrantless
searches and that the introduction into evidence of the product
of the unconstitutional transgression violated the defendant's
privilege against self-incrimination. 5 The privilege against
self-incrimination has, of course, been abandoned as a basis for
the exclusion of nontestimonial evidence,"'6 yet there is some
indication that, until recently, the Wisconsin court still viewed
the exclusionary rule as a personal constitutional right.07 How-
ever, in 1974, in Conrad v. State, 0 8 Justice Heffernan, writing
for the court, launched an extensive discussion in dicta of the
exclusionary rule, suggesting that the rule lacked a constitu-
tional basis. "The exclusionary rule is a judge-made one in
furtherance of conduct that courts have considered to be in the
public interest and to suppress conduct that is not."'' 0 He fur-
ther noted that the rule had its genesis "not in the constitution,
but in the grant of superintending powers . ... I" Most im-
portantly, Justice Heffernan recognized the two-fold purpose of
the rule as articulated in Kaplan v. Superior Court."' Conrad
105. 180 Wis. at 415, 193 N.W. at 92 (1923).
106. See Trager & Lobenfeld, The Law of Standing Under the Fourth Amendment,
41 BRooKLYN L. REv. 421, 452-53 (1975).
107. In Kuck v. State, 37 Wis. 2d 378, 386, 55 N.W.2d 26, 29 (1967), the court wrote
that "[tihe exclusion of evidence in violation of the strictures placed upon searches
and seizures has for its purpose the protection of privacy." Similarly, it has been noted
that "exclusion of evidence. . .puts meaning into the Fourth Amendment's right of
privacy and restrains the police from being over zealous in law-enforcement activi-
ties. . . . The right protected is the individual's right of privacy." Alston v. State, 30
Wis. 2d 88, 94, 140 N.W.2d 286, 289 (1966).
108. 63 Wis. 2d 616, 218 N.W.2d 252'(1974).
109. Id. at 636, 218 N.W.2d at 262.
110. Id. It is interesting to note that Justice Heffernan used the term
"superintending powers" which is the language of the Wisconsin constitutional provi-
sion bestowing superintending authority upon the court. Wis. CONST. art. VII, § 3(1).
The United States Supreme Court usually refers to its power as a "supervisory power."
See generally Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts,
supra note 29; Note, The Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, supra note 29.
111. 6 Cal. 3d 150, 491 P.2d 1, 98 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1971). Like the California court,
the Conrad court noted that:
[t]he rationale of the exclusionary rule is twofold: . . . to deter unlawful or
undesirable or unconstitutional police conduct, and . . . to insure some integ-
rity in the judicial process by not having the judicial process sanction, approve
and be party to constitutional violations or undesirable or unlawful police con-
duct in allowing evidence to be used notwithstanding the manner in which it
was seized.
63 Wis. 2d at 635, 218 N.W.2d at 262.
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therefore, seems to be based on reasoning which would point
toward acceptance of the expanded standing rule in this state.
However, before an appellate advocate can argue the merits
of state adoption of the derivative standing rule, a minor
threshold burden must be born. The language of the federal
and state constitutional proscriptions against unreasonable
searches and seizures are identical.'12 This has led the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court to remark that search and seizure problems
"are a matter of federal constitutional law"" 3 and that federal
standards and principles are "generally applicable""' to corre-
sponding state constitutional questions. However, the Wiscon-
sin court has not always seen identity of language as an abso-
lute bar to independent construction,"5 and need not continue
that course in search and seizure decisions.
If the court can be convinced that identity of constitutional
language is not an absolute barrier to divergence in constitu-
tional construction, it must next reconcile the standing issue
with the objectives of the exclusionary rule. Soon after the
federal rule of limited standing was conclusively established in
Brown, the Wisconsin Supreme Court twice passed on the
issue.
In the first case, State v. Christel, "I the court found Brown
controlling. The defendants in Christel were charged and con-
victed of possession with intent to sell hashish. The police had
discovered the hashish in an illegal search of a package ad-
dressed to a third party and sent via private parcel service. The
trial court found that the defendants lacked standing to object
112. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Wis. CONST. art. I, § 11.
113. State v. ,Paszek, 50 Wis. 2d 619, 624, 184 N.W.2d 836, 839 (1971). See also
State v. Beal, 40 Wis. 2d 607, 612, 62 N.W.2d 640, 643 (1968); Kluck v. State, 37 Wis.
2d 378, 155 N.W.2d 26 (1967).
114. State v. Paszek, 50 Wis. 2d at 624, 184 N.W.2d at 839.
115. Certainly, it is the prerogative of the State of Wisconsin to afford greater
protection to the liberties of persons within its boundaries under the Wisconsin
Constitution than is mandated by the United States Supreme Court under the
Fourteenth Amendment. . . . This court has never hesitated to do so.
This court has demonstrated that it will not be bound by the minimums
which are imposed by the Supreme Court of the United States if it is the
judgment of this court that the Constitution of Wisconsin and the laws of this
state require that greater protection of citizens' liberties ought to be afforded.
State v. Doe, 78 Wis. 2d 161, 171-72, 254 N.W.2d 210, 215-16 (1976) (citations omitted).
116. 61 Wis. 2d 143, 211 N.W.2d 801 (1973).
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to the search and the supreme court agreed."7 The defendants,
however, had failed to raise the issue of vicarious standing in
their appeal, choosing instead to rely solely on the third type
of standing established in Brown, that is, that a defendant
charged with illegal possession has automatic standing to con-
test the seizure of the contraband from him."'" But since the
Christel defendants did not possess the hashish at the time of
the search, which took place at the offices of the private parcel
service, such automatic standing was unavailable to them. Al-
though the court relied on Brown, which had specifically de-
nied derivative standing, the Christel court did not examine
the merits of the vicarious rule at all, and obviously did not
examine the issue in terms of Wisconsin law.
Later in the same term the court decided State v. Mabra. ,19
Again the defendant did not squarely raise the derivative rights
question. Nonetheless, the court discussed the rule at length,
remarking that
[i]t might well be that a defendant on the constitutional
grounds of due process and the basic concept of a fair trial
could argue that he had a constitutional right to object to any
evidence illegally seized from anyone being used against him
although such search and seizure did not violate his personal
fourth amendment right.' 21
However, the defendant in Mabra was found to have indepen-
dent grounds for standing to object to the search and seizure
and the court, therefore, found it unnecessary to pass on the
vicarious standing issue. Thb court did, however, note the logi-
cal consistency of the vicarious standing rule. Thus, the court
recognized that the function of the exclusionary rule is "to
discourage unconstitutional conduct and to insure, integrity in
the judicial process by disregarding evidence produced through
an impermissible procedure. ' '' 2' It further noted that this func-
tion is not served when the unconstitutional conduct is pro-
tected from judicial scrutiny by a rule of standing. "The logic
of the exclusionary rule, and the deterrent objectives on which
117. Id. at 155-57, 211 N.W.2d at 807-08.
118. Id. at 149-50, 211 N.W.2d at 804.
119. 61 Wis. 2d 613, 213 N.W.2d 545 (1973).
120. Id. at 621-22, 213 N.W.2d at 549-50.
121. State v. Smith, 72 Wis. 2d 711, 714, 242 N.W.2d 184, 186 (1976).
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it is based, apply equally whether or not the search itself
'aggrieved' the defendant.' 22
While it is impossible to guess whether the court would
adopt the vicarious standing rule as a matter of state constitu-
tional and judicial law, it is clear in light of Mabra that the rule
has received some recognition upon which sound argument can
be based.
B. Impeachment by Use of Inadmissible Miranda Statements
In Miranda v. Arizona,' 3 the United States Supreme Court
required that, prior to the instigation of custodial interroga-
tion, an accused must be informed of certain constitutional
rights. 24 These required warnings are intended to protect an
accused's fifth amendment rights against self-incrimination;
therefore, if the statements are obtained when the accused has
not yet been informed of his rights, when he did not understand
or intelligently waive his rights or when other circumstances
indicate that such statements were involuntarily made, they
are inadmissible in the prosecution's case in chief.'25 In Harris
v. New York, 2 however, the United States Supreme Court
decided that such "Miranda-less" statements could be used to
impeach a defendant-witness who gave testimony inconsistent
with his prior statements. 2 The Harris majority held that one
of the objectives of the Miranda rule was to deter police mis-
conduct. The Court felt, however, that "sufficient deterrence
flows when the evidence in question is made unavailable to the
prosecution in its case in chief"' and that "[t]he shield pro-
122. Commentary to AMERiCAN LAw INsTrrl MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT
PROCEDURES, Official Draft No. 1, July 15, 1972, Art. 290 § SS290.1(5), quoted in State
v. Mabra, 61 Wis. 2d 613, 622, 213 N.W.2d 545, 549 n.4 (1973). This argument was
specifically rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969).
123. 384 U.S. 438 (1966).
124. Id. at 467-73. See note 9 supra.
125. 384 U.S. at 479.
126. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
127. A distinction was made between statements which were made involuntarily
and those which were made without both the benefit of Miranda warnings and also
the intelligent waiver of Miranda rights. A statement involuntarily made cannot be
used for any purpose as it is inherently untrustworthy. For Wisconsin decisions on this
issue, see Upchurch v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 553, 219 N.W.2d 363 (1974); Wold v. State,
.57 Wis. 2d 344, 204 N.W.2d 482 (1973); Gaertner v. State, 35 Wis. 2d 159, 150 N.W.2d
370 (1967); Shepard v. State, 88 Wis. 185, 59 N.W. 449 (1894). By comparison,
"Miranda-less" statements voluntarily made in ignorance of constitutional rights are
thought not to be inherently untrustworthy.
128. 401 U.S. at 225.
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vided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use
perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation
with prior inconsistent utterances."'' 9
Four justices dissented in Harris,'30 giving two reasons for
their opinion: first, the prospect of being impeached by the
prior confession would unduly fetter the defendant's decision
whether to testify or remain silent; and second, the deterrence
objective would be undermined by admitting the tainted con-
fession for any purpose.' 3 ' Pennsylvania, Hawaii and California
have rejected Harris and held that their state constitutions
render "Miranda-defective" statements inadmissible for any
purpose.'32 In State v. Santiago,'33 the Supreme Court of Ha-
waii found that Miranda protections have "an independent
source in the Hawaii Constitution's privilege against self-
incrimination."'3 4 The court then held that the Hawaii Consti-
tution compelled the result urged by the Harris dissent. This
constitutional decision was seen as necessary in order to effec-
tively protect a defendant's right to choose whether to confess
to a crime, encourage proper police conduct and insure the
integrity of the judicial process.' 3' And in Commonwealth v.
Triplett, '3 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania took issue with
Harris. The court, citing its constitution, reasoned that the
Harris rule unfairly interfered with the defendant's right to
testify on her own behalf.' 31 In People v. Disbrow, '3 8 the Califor-
129. Id. at 226.
130. Id. It is interesting to note that the dissent, id. at 231 n.4, cited Gaertner v.
State, 35 Wis. 2d 159, 150 N.W.2d 370 (1967) as an example of Wisconsin's disagree-
ment with the Harris majority's opinion. In Gaertner, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
merely held that confessions found to be untrustworthy are to be excluded from trial.
See note 127 supra. However, there exists some dicta in the Gaertner decision from
which the Harris dissent might infer the Wisconsin court's agreement. "We do not
think an accused who takes the witness stand waives his constitutional right against
self-incrimination and involuntary confessions. 35 Wis. 2d at 173, 150 N.W.2d at 377.
Restricted to its dispositive language, the Gaertner decision stands only for the propo-
sition that involuntary statements are to be excluded because they are unworthy of
belief.
131. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. at 231-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
132. For a discussion of Harris and the contrary decisions of California, Hawaii and
Pennsylvania, see Stepping Into the Breach, supra note 4, at 352-56.
133. 53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971).
134. Id. at 266, 492 P.2d at 664.
135. Id.
136. 462 Pa. 244, 341 A.2d 62 (1975).
137. Id. at 248-49, 341 A.2d at 64; PA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
138. 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976).
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nia Supreme Court became the third state court to reject
Harris, formulating some additional reasons for excluding the
evidence. Noting that even Harris would not operate so as to
admit the defendant's involuntary statements for purposes of
impeachment, the court registered its fear that the Harris rule
would "resurrect the remains of the earlier voluntariness test
* . . [and] the evidentiary thicket Miranda was designed to
avoid."' 39 In addition, the California court shared the Harris
dissent's concern regarding a possible lessening of the deterrent
effect on police misconduct. 40 Principally, however, the court
based its ruling on the concern that a jury would be unable to
limit its consideration of the confession solely to the question
of a defendant's veracity.14'
By requiring a greater prosecutorial burden of proof in de-
termining the admissibility of Miranda statements in the pros-
ecution's case in chief, Wisconsin too has chosen to afford
greater state protection to the right against self-incrimination
than is required by the Constitution of the United States.42
While this may be a retreat from the Harris position, however,
the court has yet to completely eliminate defective Miranda
statements from a criminal trial. Having accepted the Harris
rule soon after its establishment,14 Wisconsin has adhered
strictly to it. 44 The Harris rule has not been the topic of any
dissent, nor has the Wisconsin court ever discussed expanding
on the Harris minimum.
However, if the scope of Wisconsin constitutional criminal
procedure is to be expanded, Harris seems a likely and appro-
priate target for challenge. The reasoning used by other courts,
and in particular that used by the California court, provides a
sound basis for constitutional argument. In addition, the Wis-
consin court's demonstrated concern for protection of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination, as embodied in article I, section
139. Id. at 111-12, 545 P.2d at 278, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
140. Id. at 113, 545 P.2d at 279, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 367.
141. Id. at 112, 545 P.2d at 279, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 367.
142. Compare Micale v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 370, 251 N.W.2d 458 (1977) (prosecution
must establish beyond a reasonable dcubt that Miranda rights were given and state-
ment was voluntary) with Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972) (Miranda and volun-
tariness of confession must be proven by preponderance of the evidence).
143. Ameen v. State, 51 Wis. 2d 175, 186 N.W.2d 206 (1971).
144. See Upchurch v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 553, 219 N.W.2d 363 (1974); Wold v. State,
57 Wis. 2d 344, 204 N.W.2d 482 (1973).
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8 of the state constitution, provides a solid basis for argument
in such a case.
IV. CONCLUSION
The independent use of state constitutional provisions in
matters of criminal procedure is not yet a powerful tool for the
Wisconsin criminal defense bar. It may never be. Members of
the criminal defense bar, in discussion with the writer, have
indicated a lack of enthusiasm for arguing in favor of imple-
mentation of an expansionist model of the state constitution.'45
Certainly, the argument will not excite the Wisconsin criminal
defense attorney to the degree that it has undoubtedly excited
her counterpart in California.'
Despite this lack of Wisconsin constitutional activity, re-
cent recognition of the doctrine by the court may reveal an
untapped source of constitutional activism. Whether the prac-
tice will ever become as prevalent as it has in several other
states is largely dependent on the make-up of the Wisconsin
court and the decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
A flourish of state constitutional activity would surely result if
more justices of the Wisconsin court were to view independent
state constitutional rulemaking as an appropriate exercise of
their judicial authority. On the other hand, whatever the
make-up of the Wisconsin court, the nature of Wisconsin judi-
cial tradition is such that it would be surprising were the court
to tolerate any drastic retrenchment on Warren Court criminal
procedure decisions. For example, at least four United States
Supreme Court justices have advocated an end to per se appli-
cation of the exclusionary rule.'47 It would be a surprise indeed
if Wisconsin were to follow suit and abandon the cherished
constitutional principles pronounced so long ago in Hoyer v.
State. 148
Whatever the current status of the expansionist argument,
it should not blithely be ignored by appellate counsel for crimi-
145. They have variously described the independent use of the Wisconsin Constitu-
tion as: "a garbage argument," "a one paragraph throw-in," or a "last resort."
146. The independent use of state constitutional provisions is by far more frequent
in California. See note 45 supra.
147. See Stepping Into the Breach, supra note 4, at 342; Yackle, supra note 1, at
423 n.626.
148. 180 Wis. 407, 193 N.W. 89 (1923).
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nal defendants. If nothing else, the argument forces the su-
preme court to examine the substantive merits of the procedure
in question in light of Wisconsin constitutional traditions and
values and thereby forecloses a dangerously routine reliance on
federally established minimums without examination of the
underlying principles upon which such minimums are based.
Ignoring the vitality of the Constitution of the State of Wiscon-
sin may be tantamount to ignoring the collective values of the
people of the state, but such lofty rhetoric disguises the impor-
tant effect of independent state constitutional construction -
the avoidance of erosion of individual constitutional liberties.
ERIC KLUMB
